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We examined in two empirical studies how situational and personal aspects
of uncertainty influence laypeople’s understanding of the uncertainty of scientific
information, with focus on the detection of tentativeness and perception of scientific
credibility. In the first study (N = 48), we investigated the impact of a perceived conflict
due to contradicting information as a situational, text-inherent aspect of uncertainty. The
aim of the second study (N = 61) was to explore the role of general self-efficacy as an
intra-personal uncertainty factor. In Study 1, participants read one of two versions of an
introductory text in a between-group design. This text provided them with an overview
about the neurosurgical procedure of deep brain stimulation (DBS). The text expressed
a positive attitude toward DBS in one experimental condition or focused on the negative
aspects of this method in the other condition. Then participants in both conditions
read the same text that dealt with a study about DBS as experimental treatment
in a small sample of patients with major depression. Perceived conflict between the
two texts was found to increase the perception of tentativeness and to decrease the
perception of scientific credibility, implicating that text-inherent aspects have significant
effects on critical appraisal. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that participants
with higher general self-efficacy detected the tentativeness to a lesser degree and
assumed a higher level of scientific credibility, indicating a more naïve understanding of
scientific information. This appears to be contradictory to large parts of previous findings
that showed positive effects of high self-efficacy on learning. Both studies showed
that perceived tentativeness and perceived scientific credibility of medical information
contradicted each other. We conclude that there is a need for supporting laypeople in
understanding the uncertainty of scientific information and that scientific writers should
consider how to present scientific results when compiling pertinent texts.
Keywords: perceived conflict, self-efficacy, critical appraisal, text comprehension, tentativeness, scientific
credibility, laboratory experiment
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 December 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1859
Flemming et al. Perceived Conflict and Self-Efficacy
INTRODUCTION
When searching for information, laypeople traditionally expect
scientific research to provide guiding knowledge (Niaz, 2010). In
a variety of situations, laypeople are confronted with scientific
information they have to assess and evaluate (Scharrer et al., 2012;
Bromme et al., 2014). People frequently feel a need to be better
informed, but scientific issues are usually complex, and often
they are controversial even among professional scientists. How
do people without domain expertise deal with the complexity and
uncertainty inherent in scientific information as it is presented in
texts?
As a matter of fact uncertainty and tentativeness are
characteristic for empirical results (Popper, 1968; Bromme
and Goldman, 2014; Kimmerle et al., 2015a). Controversies
are a daily occurrence in empirical sciences (Friedman et al.,
1999). “Instead of solid knowledge, we should get used to
the notion of tentative information” (Ioannidis, 2006, p. 575).
Accordingly, laypeople should also understand and comprehend
the tentativeness of findings in scientific research. This means,
for instance, to be aware that research findings are not to
be understood as everlasting absolute truth but are more or
less valid explanations that scientists deduct from empirical
studies that can have different levels of quality and underlie
several limitations (Lederman and O’Malley, 1990; Jensen, 2008).
Understanding tentativeness also means to comprehend that
these findings may contradict each other or become obsolete
when more reliable findings occur (see Sinatra et al., 2014).
So far, however, it is largely unclear to what extent laypeople
are capable of such elaborate assessment processes. Are they
aware of the tentativeness when they read about new and
yet uncertain empirical findings? At the same time, of course,
laypeople should show at least some degree of trust in reputable
scientific research. This perceived scientific credibility includes
two aspects: the belief that the research is actually science-
based and that it is reliable and trustable. It is quite plausible,
however, that it is exactly the perception and understanding of
the tentativeness of research findings that might undermine the
perceived scientific credibility of these findings (Kortenkamp and
Basten, 2015). Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
(H1) Perceived tentativeness and perceived scientific
credibility of scientific information will contradict each
other.
It is particularly relevant to examine how tentativeness
and credibility as two aspects of the uncertainty of science are
related to people’s individual aspects of uncertainty, which may
arise either in a given situation (e.g., from informational
contradictions) or result from personal dispositions.
Informational contradictions occur quite easily because,
very often, people use more than one source for evaluating
scientific information (Brossard, 2013; Maier and Richter,
2014). This may lead to a situation, for example, where they
encounter positive and optimistic information about a medical
treatment from one text and negative or critical assessment
of the same treatment from another source (see Rogers and
Gould, 2015). This constellation is supposed to result in some
sort of cognitive conflict in the recipient (see Piaget, 1977;
Limón, 2001; Kimmerle et al., 2011, 2015b). Such a perceived
conflict, in turn, may have an impact both on the understanding
of the tentativeness of scientific research findings and on the
perceived scientific credibility of this research. Previous research
has shown that conflicting information can lead to confusion
and a skeptical attitude toward science (Covello and Peters,
2002; Vardeman and Aldoory, 2008; Kortenkamp and Basten,
2015). Blankenship and Holtgraves (2005) found that written
messages that mentioned the tentativeness of scientific findings
provoked more critical attitudes toward this message. Chinn
and Brewer (1993, 1998) showed that perceived conflict due
to anomalous data can lead to reactions such as ignoring,
rejecting, or questioning the validity of these data. Since a higher
perceived conflict needs rational elaboration to be resolved and
enable conceptual change (Posner et al., 1982; Limón, 2001),
a cognitive conflict may also activate laypeople to engage in
even deeper processing of information and arguments, which
supports them in conducting appropriate critical appraisal
(Sinatra and Dole, 1998). Such critical appraisal applies to the
veracity and persuasiveness of scientific claims (Guyatt et al.,
2008; Scharrer et al., 2012) and should, accordingly, have an
impact on perceived tentativeness and credibility of research
findings. In light of these considerations, we hypothesize
that:
(H2) Contradicting information will lead to a perceived
conflict,
(H3) Higher perceived conflict will lead to a stronger
perception of tentativeness, and
(H4) Higher perceived conflict will lead to a decreased
perception of scientific credibility.
While perceived conflict represents an uncertainty factor
directly induced by situational aspects (here: contradictions
between information from different texts), the perception and
evaluation of tentativeness and scientific credibility may also be
influenced by personal aspects such as trait variables. One factor
that has an impact on whether people are confident or experience
uncertainty is their sense of self-efficacy. General self-efficacy is
the individual conviction to be able to cope with critical situations
(Bandura, 1997).
On the one hand, it has been shown that “individuals with
higher self-efficacy are capable of completing a challenging task
and are likely to engage in the challenge” (Lo et al., 2013, p. 56).
So one might assume that a high level of self-efficacy would come
along with improved processes of attention and elaboration.
This could result in better information processing, which might
also apply to the perception of tentativeness and credibility of
scientific information.
On the other hand, previous findings suggest that one’s
critical appraisal can be impaired by personal overestimation
of the own cognitive ability (Ackerman et al., 2002). Such an
overestimation could result from a high level of general self-
efficacy since general self-efficacy leads to a more optimistic
estimation of one’s own competences and abilities (Caprara et al.,
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2011; Bandura, 2012; see Pintrich et al., 1993). Karademas et al.
(2007) even showed that high self-efficacy and profuse optimism
may cause biased information processing. This is supported by
a recent meta-analysis that scrutinized influencing factors on
individuals’ overestimation of their own abilities (Zell and Krizan,
2014).
Because overestimation is particularly likely to happen
in domains where an individual does not have sufficient
competencies (Ehrlinger et al., 2008), we expect laypeople to
be affected by this effect. In scientific contexts laypeople have
low abilities for critical appraisal (Chinn, 2011). This means
that laypeople with a high level of general self-efficacy would
be less able to recognize the tentativeness of scientific research
findings appropriately, while at the same time would overrate
their scientific credibility. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
(H5) Higher general self-efficacy will be associated with a
weaker perception of tentativeness and
(H6) Higher general self-efficacy will be associated with an
enhanced perception of scientific credibility.
We tested H2-4 and H5-6 separately in two laboratory studies
and examined H1 in both studies.
STUDY 1
Materials and Methods
Study Design
We conducted an experimental study using a between-
group design. Participants were randomly allocated into one
of two experimental conditions, confronting them either
with two contradicting or two non-contradicting sources of
information. Outcome variables were perceived conflict, perceived
tentativeness, and perceived scientific credibility. Additionally,
several demographic measures (sex, age, final school grade) were
collected to control for possible confounders.
Participants
The sample consisted of 48 participants of 19–71 years
recruited via a University-wide recruiting panel. This panel
is composed of volunteers from the local population and
includes people with wide demographic backgrounds but with
university students as the major audience. Those volunteers
have agreed to receive e-mail invitations for participation
in laboratory studies to which they may enroll if they
are interested. All participants in this study were German
native speakers, stated to have no prior knowledge about
the medical domain used in our material, gave full written
informed consent, and were naïve to the purposes of the study.
TABLE 1 | Sample demographics of Study 1.
Sex 33 Women (68.75%) 15 Men (31.25%)
Age M = 28.94 SD = 11.29 Range: 19–71
Final school grade M = 2.05 SD = 0.58 Range: 1.0–3.4
Note for school grade: 1.0 = best, 4.0 = worst.
Students of medicine and psychology were not admitted to
participation. Table 1 shows the demographic features of this
sample.
Participation took about 60 min and was compensated with 8
Euros. Ethical approval was obtained from the institutional board
of ethics.
Procedure
After giving informed consent, participants read an introductory
text about a medical topic. The topic chosen here was the
neurosurgical procedure of deep brain stimulation (DBS).
This text came in two different versions—depending on the
experimental condition. One text version expressed a rather
positive attitude toward DBS and one focused on the negative
aspects of this procedure (see next section for details). After
that, the participants in both conditions read the same target
text about the experimental application of DBS as a treatment
for patients suffering from intractable major depression. The
results presented in this second text were largely positive so
that the participants in one condition had to deal with two
contradicting sources of information while the participants in
the other condition had to deal with non-contradicting sources
of information. This experimental treatment was followed by a
manipulation check and three questionnaires that measured the
outcome variables. Concluding, demographic information was
collected.
Instruments and Material
Introductory text
The first text participants had to read gave an overview about
DBS in general and as a therapy for Parkinson’s disease in
particular. This text consisted of 543 (positive version) or
607 (negative version) words, respectively. Both texts outlined
the procedure and the functional principle of DBS, which
consists of implanting electrodes in particular brain areas in
order to stimulate or inhibit functional systems via slight
electrical tension. This does not cure the ultimate causes of
psycho-motoric diseases but results in diminished motoric
symptoms permitting patients to regain substantial quality of
life and independence. Despite the possible benefits in several
application areas (e.g., Parkinson’s disease, essential tremor;
Garonzik et al., 2013), experimental use of DBS in other
fields such as depression or anxiety disorders is a controversial
issue since there is lack of empirical evidence (e.g., Lozano
et al., 2012) and several ethical concerns (Clausen, 2009,
2011).
The positive version of the text mainly focused on chances
and success of DBS (e.g., improvement of walking and balance
dysfunctions in Parkinson’s patients), while the negative version
focused on risks and possible side-effects (such as complications
that might occur during or after surgery). Nevertheless, the
communicated facts about DBS were the same in both conditions
and all pieces of information were scientifically correct.
Target text
All participants read the same text that dealt with a single,
small-sample exploratory study on DBS as a new treatment for
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intractable major depression. This target text consisted of 812
words. It portrayed the study results in a positive frame (e.g., “The
brain pacemaker that was implemented alleviated symptoms
of depression in six of seven patients”). But it also provided
references to the tentativeness of the study findings (e.g., “‘We
definitely need larger samples to ascertain that we actually found
a more effective solution than in earlier attempts’, neurosurgeon
Karl Kiening . . . pronounces”; see e.g., Kiening and Sartorius,
2013). Thus, the article delivered neutral facts from a slightly
optimistic point of view, but also highlighted the limitations of
the study (e.g., lack of a control group, no long-term observation,
etc.).
Questionnaires
After reading the two texts, participants were asked to indicate
their perceived conflict between the texts by rating their
agreement to five statements on a 7-point Likert scale. The sum of
all item scores (some reversed) resulted in a possible score range
of 5–35, with higher values indicating higher perceived conflict.
The items of this scale are presented in Table 2.
Perceived tentativeness of the findings presented in the target
text was measured by a 7-point Likert scale as well. It consisted
of five items yielding a possible score range of 5–35, with higher
values indicating higher perceived tentativeness. Table 3 shows
all items of this questionnaire.
Participants had to rate three items asking for the perceived
scientific credibility of the target text on a 7-point Likert-scale,
resulting in a possible score range of 3–21. Higher values
represent higher perceived scientific credibility. Table 4 presents
all items of this questionnaire.
Results
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the three outcome
variables.
To test the hypothesis that perceived tentativeness and
perceived scientific credibility would contradict each other (H1),
we calculated Spearman’s correlation coefficient between those
dependent variables. As expected, we found a significant negative
relationship: r = −0.421; p = 0.003.
In (H2) we expected that contradicting sources of information
would lead to a perceived conflict. We tested this hypothesis by
conducting a one-sided t-test. As assumed we found that after
reading the target text the participants who first read the negative
version of the introductory text perceived a higher conflict
between the two texts (18.04 ± 5.37) than the participants who
read the positive version of the introductory text (14.95 ± 6.10),
[t(48) = 1.863; p = 0.035].
We also expected that higher perceived conflict would
lead to a stronger perception of tentativeness (H3) and to a
decreased perception of scientific credibility (H4). We tested
both hypotheses via linear regression models. As expected, the
linear regression model on perceived tentativeness as dependent
variable revealed a significant positive association with perceived
conflict (standardized β = 0.513; p< 0.001). Thus, the higher the
perceived conflict between the introductory text and the target
text, the better people were able to detect tentativeness of findings
described in the latter.
As hypothesized, the linear regression model on perceived
scientific credibility as dependent variable revealed a significant
negative impact of perceived conflict (standardized β = −0.374;
p = 0.012). Hence, the higher the perceived conflict between the
introductory text and the target text, the lower people rated the
scientific credibility of the findings described in the second text.
The results of both models did not change substantially if
controlled for sex, age, and final school grade. Nevertheless, we
cannot exclude possible influences of individual trait variables
that may also have an impact on measures of critical appraisal.
Thus, we conducted another study that focused on the impact of
a potentially relevant trait variable.
STUDY 2
Materials and Methods
Study Design
In this laboratory study all participants read a target text about
DBS. As a trait variable we measured participants’ general
self-efficacy. Dependent variables were perceived tentativeness
and perceived scientific credibility. To control for possible
confounders, we also collected demographic data (sex, age, final
school grade).
Participants
From the same panel as described in Study 1, we recruited 61
students from 18 to 35 years who all were native speakers, stated
to have no prior knowledge of DBS, gave full written informed
consent, and were reimbursed for their participation. Students
of medicine and psychology were excluded from participation.
Volunteers who had already taken part in Study 1 were not
TABLE 2 | Perceived conflict questionnaire.
Number Item
(1) The texts contradict each other.
(2) With regard to content, the texts complement one another very
well.∗
(3) Overall, the texts provide a balanced picture of the topic.∗
(4) After reading the texts, I find it hard to deliver a concluding
judgment on DBS.
(5) The texts concur in their basic message.∗
∗Reversed items.
TABLE 3 | Perceived tentativeness questionnaire.
Number Item
(1) The results of the study are not very definite.
(2) Our knowledge about the application of DBS for
treating depression is not complete yet.
(3) The study is conclusive.∗
(4) Correct conclusions were drawn from the results.∗
(5) The study provides a stable basis to decide about future
application or non-application of DBS in depression.∗
∗Reversed items.
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TABLE 4 | Perceived scientific credibility questionnaire.
Number Item
(1) How science-based was the text?
(2) How credible was the text?
(3) As how scientifically credible would an expert rate the
text in your opinion?
TABLE 5 | Descriptive statistics of variables in Study 1.
Scale Items Possible range Mean SD
Perceived conflict 5 5–35 16.62 5.86
Perceived tentativeness 5 5–35 22.52 4.07
Perceived scientific credibility 3 3–21 11.96 3.86
admitted to participate. Table 6 shows the demographic features
of this sample.
Participation took about 45 min and was compensated with 6
Euros. Ethical approval was obtained from the institutional board
of ethics.
Procedure
After giving informed consent, all participants read a text about
the experimental application of DBS as treatment for patients
suffering from major depression. Then they filled in a set of
questionnaires (general self-efficacy, perceived tentativeness, and
perceived scientific credibility). Finally, participants were asked for
demographic information.
Instruments and Material
Target text
We used the same text as in Study 1, only slightly adapted
and complemented by some subheadings for better readability,
resulting in 832 words.
Questionnaires
Administered questionnaires were basically the same as in Study
1. While the questionnaire for perceived scientific credibility was
identical to that in Study 1 (see Table 4), the questionnaire
for perceived tentativeness was altered to improve accuracy
(regarding concrete reference to the study reported in the target
text) and to address more facets of tentativeness (see Bromme
and Goldman, 2014). The revised form consisted of six items
yielding a possible score range of 6–42, with higher values
indicating higher perceived tentativeness. Table 7 shows the
revised questionnaire.
General self-efficacy was obtained using the General Self-
Efficacy Scale (GSE) by Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995). This
questionnaire consists of 10 statements that participants had to
rate regarding their agreement or disagreement on a 4-point
TABLE 6 | Sample demographics of Study 2.
Sex 48 Women (78.69%) 13 Men (21.31%)
Age M = 23.34 SD = 3.59 Range: 18–34
Final school grade M = 2.03 SD = 0.64 Range: 1.0–3.5
Note for school grade: 1.0 = best, 4.0 = worst.
TABLE 7 | Perceived tentativeness questionnaire – revised form.
Number Item
(1) The results of the study are not very definite.
(2) After this study, our knowledge about the application of DBS for
treating depression is not complete yet.
(3) The study is conclusive.∗
(4) The findings are reliable.∗
(5) The study provides a stable basis to decide about future
application or non-application of DBS in depression.∗
(6) The results of the study should be viewed as tentative.
∗Reversed items.
scale. Summing up the responses to all ten items resulted in a
sum score ranging from 10 to 40. The whole scale is depicted in
Table 8.
Results
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics for general self-efficacy,
perceived tentativeness, and perceived scientific credibility.
Like in Study 1, we expected that perceived tentativeness
and perceived scientific credibility would contradict each other
(H1). Again, we calculated Spearman’s correlation coefficient
between perceived tentativeness and perceived scientific
credibility to test this hypothesis. As expected, we found a
negative relationship between those variables: r = −0.389;
p = 0.002.
We further assumed that higher general self-efficacy would be
associated with a weaker perception of tentativeness (H5) and
with an enhanced perception of scientific credibility (H6). We
tested these hypotheses using linear regression models.
As hypothesized, linear regression modeling revealed a
significant negative association between general self-efficacy and
perceived tentativeness. The higher participants’ general self-
efficacy, the less they were able to detect the tentativeness of
findings described in the target text (standardized β = −0.289;
p = 0.024).
As assumed, the linear regression model on perceived
scientific credibility showed a significant association with general
self-efficacy. The higher participants’ general self-efficacy, the
TABLE 8 | General self-efficacy scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem, 1995).
Number Item
(1) I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
(2) If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get
what I want.
(3) It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
(4) I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
(5) Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen
situations.
(6) I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
(7) I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my
coping abilities.
(8) When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several
solutions.
(9) If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
(10) I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
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TABLE 9 | Descriptive statistics of variables in Study 2.
Scale Items Possible range Mean SD
General self-efficacy 10 10–40 30.18 4.46
Perceived tentativeness 6 6–42 28.84 4.76
Perceived scientific credibility 3 3–21 11.70 3.45
higher they rated the scientific credibility of the findings
described in the target text (standardized β = 0.406; p = 0.001).
The results of both models did not change substantially if
controlled for sex, age, and final school grade.
DISCUSSION
In Study 1, we examined whether the processing of contradicting
texts sources had an impact on laypeople’s perception of conflict
and how this influenced their critical appraisal. As assumed,
we found that the processing of contradicting sources resulted
in higher perceived conflict, which, in turn, lead to a stronger
perception of tentativeness as well as to a decreased perception
of scientific credibility of a medical study reported in the second
text. Accordingly, perception of tentativeness and perception of
scientific credibility were negatively correlated.
We could show in Study 1 that external, that is, text-
inherent factors had a significant impact on critical appraisal.
Although the target text was totally identical in both experimental
conditions, the mere perception of a conflict between the general
message of this text and a prior introductory text made a
decisive difference in how participants processed and assessed the
second text. They were more critical the higher they perceived
the conflict between the two texts, which became apparent
in a better detection of tentativeness and the lower ratings
for perceived scientific credibility. This is in line with the
aforementioned findings of Covello and Peters (2002) as well as
Vardeman and Aldoory (2008) that conflicting information can
lead to a more skeptical attitude toward science and medicine.
While a better detection of tentativeness is probably preferable,
increased skepticism against science itself is not a goal of science
communication. It should be an aim of science education to
explain that salience of tentativeness is not necessarily a clue
for unreliable or untrustworthy science, but rather for a correct
and precise consideration of the limitations and boundaries,
which is an eminent element of accuracy and quality in
science.
Due to the fact that there are no established tools yet to
measure our dependent variables, we had to develop our
own scales for perceived conflict, perceived tentativeness,
and perception of scientific credibility. Although successfully
tested in a material test and a prior study, external validity
cannot be ultimately guaranteed. In addition, we do not
know whether the influence of conflicting information
also works outside the laboratory, where the participants
were focused and instructed to read the texts one after
another. One may assume that in real-life information search,
occurrence of cognitive conflict is less likely than in our
laboratory situation because laypeople would potentially
tend to avoid information that seems to be contradictory
to their prior knowledge or attitude (Chinn and Brewer,
1998).
In Study 2, we tested how general self-efficacy as an individual
trait variable affected laypeople’s ratings of tentativeness and
scientific credibility when reading science-related texts. We could
replicate our finding from Study 1 that perception of tentativeness
and perceived scientific credibility are opposed to each other.
Furthermore, we found a significant negative association between
general self-efficacy and perceived tentativeness as well as a
significant positive association between general self-efficacy and
perceived scientific credibility.
Due to the fact that self-efficacy was not experimentally
manipulated but measured as a trait variable, we have to be
careful in interpreting these findings with respect to their
causality. Nevertheless, since we can assume that general self-
efficacy is a rather stable trait variable and changes only over
longer time periods (Bandura, 2012; Ouweneel et al., 2013),
it seems plausible that it was the inter-personal differences
in general self-efficacy that predicted parts of the variance in
perceived tentativeness and perceived scientific credibility, not
the other way round.
Our findings are limited by the fact that our samples consisted
mainly of university students who may be more qualified to
rate the tentativeness and scientific credibility of information
from scientific texts than the general population. In addition,
it is not entirely clear how the effect of general self-efficacy
on critical appraisal works in real-life-conditions outside the
laboratory.
Taken together, the results of both studies show that
when laypeople read texts that contain scientific information,
their perception of tentativeness and the perceived scientific
credibility of the information are diametrically opposed. It
seems that the better they are able to detect and understand
that the findings mentioned in the text have to be seen
as tentative and fragile and as a result of the scientists’
observation and interpretation of one single study, the
more they doubt the scientific trustworthiness of the text
that reports these findings. On the one hand, it seems
preferable when laypeople learn to view scientific texts
with adequate skepticism and form their own opinion,
integrating all positive and negative findings and results
about a certain scientific topic. On the other hand, one could
also interpret these results in the way that laypeople seem to
have more trust toward scientific results, the more definite
and unquestioningly they are presented (Kimmerle et al.,
2013). From the eyes of a scientific expert, however, such
reduction of complexity would mean a loss of accuracy,
and, as a consequence, a loss of scientific credibility
(Bientzle et al., 2013). Thus, texts that are scientific for
experts may appear to be less “scientific” to laypeople.
There is obviously eminent need for training laypeople’s
capabilities for adequate appraisal. Moreover, experts
and science journalists should be aware of this dilemma
and consider in detail which phrases to use and how to
present scientific results when compiling pertinent texts.
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Our results also show that laypeople’s perception of tentativeness
and perceived scientific credibility are affected by both situational
and personal aspects. The influence of text-inherent variables
can be taken into account and adequately addressed by
scientific writers, in terms of whether and how to state out
conflicts within the topic or whether and how to make
tentativeness salient in a text (Kimmerle et al., 2015a). This
requires awareness about the effect of these factors amongst
science journalists and other authors who deal with scientific
information.
However, personal trait variables like general self-efficacy
cannot be influenced by text composition. But at least, authors
should be aware that appraisal of the results mentioned in
their texts can highly differ due to interpersonal differences.
Thus, it is all the more important that writers take text-
inherent factors into account in order to support laypeople in
understanding the tentativeness of scientific information as far
as possible. Another practically relevant question is how those
people with a high level of general self-efficacy—who appear to
be vulnerable to underestimating the tentativeness of scientific
information—could be prevented from a too naïve perception
of scientific texts. This issue needs to be addressed in future
studies.
What our results cannot reveal is what interpersonal
differences in perception of tentativeness and perceived scientific
credibility may implicate. There are well-examined positive
effects of high self-efficacy on learning (e.g., Pintrich and de
Groot, 1990; Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2003), so high self-
efficacy has been shown to be a beneficial trait from an
educational point of view. Apparently in contradiction to this,
it seems that although high self-efficacy may support learning,
it does not support critical appraisal, but comes along with a
more naïve reception of information. This contradiction should
be examined in future research as well. It would be a desirable
educational goal to support laypeople in learning from a scientific
text, while at the same time supporting them in critically
evaluating its content.
While our results show that—under certain conditions—when
asked by a questionnaire, laypeople are able to assess tentativeness
in texts that contain scientific information, little is known about
how perceived tentativeness influences their opinion formation,
attitude and, in consequence, judgements about health-related
issues as whether to undergo a certain treatment or not (see
Bientzle et al., 2015; Fissler et al., 2015). These questions should
also be addressed in further studies.
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